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Abstract 
 
The EU budget needs to be radically reformed if it is to reflect the priorities of an expanding and 
deepening Union. Over 40% of EU spending is dedicated to support for agriculture, a declining sector; 
spending for research and innovation, the main driver of productivity growth, is too small; and there is 
no room in the budget for the new public goods of internal and external security that public opinion 
demands. Reform is impossible, however, as long as the budget is determined by an inter-governmental 
negotiation in which no party defends the over-arching European interest. Each member country only 
cares about its own ‘net balance’. Radical changes are needed both in the content of the budget – its 
revenues and spending programmes – and in the decision-making procedures to endow the Union with 
an effective instrument to foster its policy goals. The latter is a precondition for the former. Only with a 
new procedure, one in which European interests dominate, can the Union obtain a better budget. The 
European Parliament, which represents European citizens directly, must be given the main say 
concerning the structure of the budget, whereas the Council should provide appropriate safeguards 
against excessive spending. Movement in this direction can start immediately, even within the present 
legal framework, if Parliament uses its veto power to ensure a better allocation of expenditure.  
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1.  Introduction: The need for a fundamental 
rethink of the EU budget 
Most independent observers agree that the budget of the 
European Union no longer reflects its main tasks and policy 
goals. Support for agriculture, a declining sector with little 
prospects of employment and growth, still represents over 
40% of total expenditures; funds for education, research 
and infrastructures barely surpass one-third of the total; the 
allocation of money to the paramount goals of foreign 
policy, defence, internal security, immigration and citizen 
rights is negligible, despite strong demand by the public for 
greater Union involvement in these areas. 
The current composition of spending is the result of 
historical accidents. The key driver behind the two items 
that now dominate the budget – agriculture and regional aid 
– was the perception in a grey past that Europe needed to 
ensure its own food supply and, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
that poorer member countries needed to be bribed to accept 
the internal market and monetary union. The main legacy 
of the ‘founding’ compromises on agriculture and structural 
funds is that the budget is basically seen as a vehicle for the 
redistribution of money between member states, rather than 
a tool for fostering common goals.  
National interests are thus framed exclusively in terms of 
what national treasuries have to pay to, and what farmers 
and regions at home are likely to receive from the EU 
budget. But this means that in the intergovernmental 
negotiations that determine the budget no voice will defend 
overall EU interests. For any individual member country 
the return from defending an EU-wide, encompassing 
interest is negligible compared to the advantage it can 
obtain from a change in the budget that might lead to lower 
overall efficiency, but to more money for its own citizens 
or regional governments.  
Thus, negotiations on the budget mainly are of an 
intergovernmental nature, and tend to concentrate on the 
net balances resulting from national contributions to the 
budget and funds received by each country under the 
various spending programmes.  
European citizens have no clear perception of the total cost 
of the Union and the overall benefits of common action 
financed by the budget, but they are well aware of 
budgetary transfers in their favour and place pressure on 
their government to preserve them indefinitely.  
The increasing detachment of the budget from the Union’s 
own objectives is sustained by decision-making procedures 
that entail strong rigidity in budgetary allocations.  
The decisions on the resource ceiling and the allocation of 
spending among the main budget headings are taken with 
the multi-year financial perspectives (MYFP), by 
established practice for seven years; they belong to the 
Council and require unanimity. Moreover, more often than 
not, decisions on agriculture and other multi-year 
programmes (e.g. research) are taken outside the budgetary 
procedures and with reference to a different time frame. 
The European Parliament only has formal decision powers 
in the yearly budget, after the ceilings for spending for the 
main headings have been set by the multi-year financial 
perspectives; at this stage, reshuffling resources around is 
close to impossible. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 
budgetary allocations are only a pale reflection of the 
evolving policy goals of the Union. 
The negotiations for the new MYFP 2007-13, already under 
way, are not tackling the issue. They have already been 
prejudged by the Franco-German compromise, in 2002, to 
block further reform of agricultural policies until 2013. On 
this premise, the Commission proposal to increase 
budgetary appropriations up to 1.24% of the EU combined 
GNI would simply increase to unsustainable levels the 
national contributions of net payers with scant value added 
to common policies. 
On the other hand, the stated intention by a growing 
number of member states to limit appropriation 
commitments to 1% of GDP squarely shifts most of the 
adjustment burden onto structural funds, a sure harbinger of 
bitter rows and negotiating standoffs between old recipients 
and new entrants. There will be little room for the shift of 
resources in favour of research, education and institution-
building, badly needed to revamp growth, and the new 
requirements for foreign policy, defence and internal 
security. 2 | Gros & Micossi 
We should seize the occasion of these ongoing negotiations 
to open discussion on a fundamental rethink of the EU 
budget. This is the last chance to do so without being under 
duress. By 2013, the impending accession of Turkey will in 
any event deal the final deathblow to the present budget 
structure. 
Radical changes are needed both in the content of the 
budget – its revenues and spending programmes – and 
decision-making procedures to endow the Union with an 
effective instrument to foster its policy goals. The latter is a 
precondition for the former. Only with a new procedure, 
one in which European interests dominate, will the Union 
obtain a better budget. 
Citizens must be made fully aware of the costs and benefits 
of the European budget, to be able to decide deliberately on 
the money they are willing to spare for the Union. The 
European Parliament, which is the citizens’ direct 
representative in European institutions, must be given the 
main say in budgetary decisions, with appropriate 
safeguards against excessive spending. The debate on these 
changes should be opened immediately. 
It is not possible to change the formal decision-making 
procedure before the Constitutional Treaty has entered into 
force, but the nature of the budgetary process could be 
changed radically if a political agreement can be reached on 
what is needed. 
The European Parliament can make a major contribution by 
refusing to recognise the calamitous deal on preserving 
agricultural spending at current levels until 2013.
1 The 
Council should know that a low ceiling on own resources, 
is incompatible with continuing spending on agriculture. 
This contribution starts by analysing what Union policies 
should be and, as a consequence, what changes would be 
required in the way resources for the Union are raised. It 
then turns to how decision-making procedures should be 
changed to make the budget an expression of European, 
rather than national interests, and an effective instrument in 
support of Union policies. In the conclusion, we sketch a 
budget that ‘makes sense’ for the Union of the 2010s. 
2.  What tasks for the EU budget? 
What tasks should the European Union usefully perform, 
and does the Union require a much bigger budget to do 
them? Historically the first aim of the European Union has 
been to open markets and integrate national economies. 
Market integration has been largely achieved for 
manufactured products, but not yet in the main for services, 
where a lot needs to be done; this function is mainly of a 
regulatory nature, however, and does not require substantial 
spending at the EU level. Greater resources are mainly 
                                                 
1 Formally this agreement set a ceiling on agricultural 
spending. Politically it has been interpreted, at least in France, 
as setting a floor. Parliament has implicitly accepted this 
agreement; it should now emphasise that it has accepted it as a 
ceiling. See Annex 2 for more details. 
needed to strengthen market surveillance and enforcement 
at national level. 
The final step in economic integration – the adoption of a 
common currency – has also already been taken. However, 
the approach that underlies the Maastricht Treaty also 
implies that the monetary union can be run without a large 
central budget, since fiscal policy has clearly been left in 
the hands of the member states. We doubt that there are 
great gains to be reaped from an enhanced coordination of 
national fiscal policies for anti-cyclical purposes; but even 
if this activity were entrusted to the Union, it would not 
seem to require a large budget.
2 
2.1 Agriculture 
Turning to the common agricultural policy (CAP), there is 
broad agreement that all subsidies and price support should 
be phased out and replaced by direct payments to farmers 
and rural development policies. It is also clear that the 
member states are in a better position than the Union to 
execute this ‘new’ agricultural policy, which basically 
entails decisions affecting inter-personal redistribution and 
local development. 
It should also be noted that agricultural spending is a major 
distorting factor in the EU economy and a distinct obstacle 
to the implementation of the Lisbon agenda. The new 
members of the Union are likely to suffer most from its 
continuing existence, since the CAP pushes relative prices 
and incomes in favour of agriculture and thus discourages 
investment in industry and services, where the potential for 
technical progress and productivity increase is much larger. 
Moreover, the Union external actions for development aid 
are made ineffective and crippled politically by the barriers 
to agricultural trade maintained because of the CAP. 
Historically agricultural spending has been a major source 
of tension between the member states, due to the skewed 
distribution of payments (Figure 1) and their impact on 
countries’ net balances vis-à-vis the EU. Payments to 
French farmers alone make up almost one-quarter of total 
CAP spending; together, French, German and Italian 
farmers take away about one-half of the total, or one-
quarter of the entire EU budget. As may be seen from 
Figure 2, there is a strong positive relationship between 
agricultural spending and the size of countries’ net balances 
with the Union. Agricultural spending undermines the 
legitimacy of the Union budget amongst the member states 
and their citizens. Phasing out the CAP will help restore a 
climate of solidarity and shared interest in the future 
negotiations on the budget and the new budgetary rules. 
                                                 
2 Cyclical stabilisation could be undertaken simply by 
coordinating national budgets, as advocated by many authors. 
Asymmetric shocks could be dealt with by establishing a 
common insurance fund to provide appropriate (temporary) 
financial assistance to countries hit by them. A Better Budget for the European Union | 3 
Figure 1. EU expenditure allocated by member state in 2003 
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Source: European Commission, September 2004. 4 | Gros & Micossi 
Figure 2. The relation between member states’ net balances vis-à-vis the EU agriculture spending (upper chart) 
and GNP/GNI* per head (lower chart) (pooled cross section and time series, 1997-2003) 
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* Since 2002, GNP has been replaced by GNI in the EU budgetary and own resources area in accordance with Council Decision No. 
2000/597. 
Source: European Commission, September 2004. 
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2.2 Structural  Funds 
When the Internal Market programme was launched and 
the plans for EMU began to take form, it was argued that 
the European Union needed to compensate poorer member 
countries for agreeing to these steps, leading to a large 
increase in structural fund support for the poorer countries 
and regions of the Union (see Table 1). 
The implicit assumption was that the poorer member 
countries took a risk by exposing their weaker economies to 
the full competition resulting from the internal market and 
by agreeing to plans for a common currency, which would 
require budgetary efforts on their part. Experience has 
shown, however, that weaker economies actually benefit 
more from the internal market and the introduction of the 
euro. And the empirical evidence suggesting that EU 
structural funds have, on average, accelerated economic 
convergence of poor regions is weak. Nevertheless, this 
result hides opposite cases of remarkable success and utter 
failure, indicating that the way structural funds are spent 
and the economic context where they are injected make a 
whole lot of a difference. 
 
Moreover, structural funds represent a visible commitment 
to the value of economic and social cohesion within the 
Union, underpinned by Treaty recognition. This concrete 
expression of solidarity between the member states and 
their people is also necessary for an effective functioning of 
the Union’s political institutions. 
Accordingly, while financing under this heading should 
continue to exist, it should also be clear that support cannot 
last forever and should be phased out as countries enjoy 
rising standards of living as a result of integration. To this 
end, eligibility should be based on objective and transparent 
criteria of relative economic and social development, as 
already heralded by Agenda 2000, as well as include 
incentives to reward best performers. Objective eligibility 
criteria carry the additional desirable consequence that the 
funds obtained by each country are influenced, but not 
directly determined by political negotiations among the 
member states, helping to enhance the perception of 
structural funds policy as a European public good. 
Table 1. Appropriations for commitments (annual average) in the multi-year financial perspectives (1988-2013) 
   DELORS I
a DELORS  II
b AGENDA  2000
c NEW  MYFP 
    1988-92 1993-99 2000-06  2007-13 
Appropriations for commitments  Mio 
ECU  % EU  Mio 
ECU  % EU  Mio €*  % EU  Mio €  % EU 
1. Agriculture  28,440
** 58.1  36,503 48.2  42,534  46.1       
CAP 28,440
** 58.1      38,196  41.4  43,011 29.4 
Rural development and other              4,339  4.7 14,797  10.1 
2. Structural operations  10,628  21.7  25,200  33.3  30,430  33.0      
Cohesion fund        2,164  2.9  12,104  13.1  49,273***  33.6 
Structural funds        23,035  30.4  27,859  30.2      
3. Internal policies  1,862  3.8  4,512  6.0  6,261  6.8  21,609  14.8 
Competitiveness for growth and employment                   18,965  13.0 
Citizenship, freedom, security and justice                   2,644  1.8 
4.  External  actions  2,498 5.1  5,200 6.9  8,100  8.8  13,656 9.3 
External  actions  2,498 5.1  4,629 6.1  4,580  5.0       
Emergency aid        271  0.4  200  0.2      
Loan guarantees        300  0.4  200  0.2      
Pre-accession aid              3120  3.4      
5.  Administration  4,540 9.3  3,640 4.8  4,809  5.2  4,089 2.8 
6. Monetary reserves  1,000  2.0  643  0.8  179  0.2      
Total  48,968 100  75,698 100  92,313  100 146,434 100 
Appropriations for payments  46,936     72,177     91,643     132,671    
Appropriations for payments (% of GNP)  1.15     1.22     1.07    
GNI1.14    
Own resource ceiling (% of GNP)  1.18     1.23     1.27    
GNI 1.24    
a Heading 3 included multi-year policies (R&D, IMP); Heading 4 included “other non-compulsory policies”. 
b Heading 3 included R&D, TENs, environment and the functioning of internal market. 
c Internal policies includes: training, youth culture etc.; energy, nuclear and environment; consumer protection, internal market etc.; research and 
technological development, other internal policies. 
* 1 ecu = 1 euro. 
** Allocation for EAGGF, section guarantee only. 
*** Cohesion and Solidarity funds included. 
Sources: European Commission and authors’ own estimates. 6 | Gros & Micossi 
In the coming years financing requirements under this 
heading will decline for recipients in the EU-15, reflecting 
higher incomes per capita, but will have to increase to 
support institution-building, infrastructures and environ-
mental upgrading in the new member states. 
As for policies specifically designed to raise growth, the 
Sapir Report (Sapir et al., 2003) has argued that a new 
heading should be created in the European budget, with 
substantial resources for trans-European infrastructure 
networks and research. The Commission proposal for the 
new MYFP 2007-13 has taken up the proposal. 
Indeed, public policies can play an important role in raising 
productivity, growth and employment. However, larger 
public spending will not work, unless there is an economic 
and social environment open to competition and favourable 
to risk-taking and change. The dismal growth performance 
of the European economy in the past decade – mainly 
reflecting the French, German and Italian economies – is by 
and large the result of rigid labour and capital markets, 
baroque institutions that block entry and competition, and 
massively distorted incentives. In these circumstances, 
higher public investment would not succeed and would 
feed inefficiency and waste.  
It should also be borne in mind that resources available in 
the budget of the Union for public investment are a tiny 
fraction of member states’ spending under these headings 
and, more importantly, that the rules and decisions that 
determine the outcome of these public programmes are 
adopted by national governments back home. Therefore, 
the European Union can in the main play a role as a catalyst 
of better policies, including better spending, at national 
level; its success will depend on national policies following 
suit. 
2.3  A new focus: R&D? 
The one area where this conclusion might be challenged is 
research and development, which constitute a typical public 
good whose benefits extend far beyond national 
boundaries. Moreover, recent research suggests that R&D 
is a key growth factor. This combination of ideas was 
behind the emphasis in the Lisbon agenda on the 
‘knowledge society’. To what extent the public goods 
nature of R&D actually can provide a rationale for large-
scale spending at the EU level is discussed in more detail in 
Annex 1. 
The main conclusion is that a substantial increase in the 
funds for research in the EU budget is justified. More 
money is needed for funding public and private research 
centres and networks of excellence in all sciences, and to 
greatly enhance the mobility of researchers.  
But more resources cannot be justified unless EU funds are 
spent more productively. The present system – whereby 
priorities in the Framework Programmes are the result of 
political negotiations in the Council and funds are 
disbursed by the European Commission – should be 
abandoned, because it leads to a wasteful multiplication of 
priorities and fragmentation of grants. The Union should 
also abandon the direct funding of own research outfits that 
inevitably fall prone to bureaucratic management and 
political influences. The Joint Research Centre, which is a 
major drain on scarce resources and a source of waste, 
should be dismantled. 
A new ‘European Science Agency’, shaped on the example 
of the US National Science Foundation, should be set up to 
foster scientific excellence, identify priority areas for 
research and ensure the highest standards in project 
selection. The establishment of public and private European 
research centres and networks of excellence should receive 
strong support, and high priority should be placed on 
fostering researchers’ mobility. 
However, increased EU funding alone cannot bring 
European R&D to the level required to allow the Union to 
realise its goals about the ‘knowledge society’. Over 95% 
of all R&D spending in Europe remain at the national level. 
Moreover, as shown in Annex 1, R&D spending in Europe 
yields a much lower return in terms of commercially 
exploitable ideas. The main problem is to make European 
research spending more effective, and the  key step to take 
to this end is to open the  market for research funds. Not 
only EU R&D funding, but also national funding should be 
opened to competition Union-wide, including all national 
science support programmes. 
2.4  New areas: Internal and external security 
Then, it is useful to consider other new functions (‘public 
goods’) that the Union usefully can, and must, take up on a 
much larger scale. 
Indeed, the European Union is clearly moving beyond the 
scope of a pure ‘economic union’. Over the last few 
decades it has been steadily adding elements of political 
integration by moving into such areas as internal and 
external security and foreign policy. 
With the free movement of people within the EU, the need 
for a common approach to guarding external borders and 
combating international crime has become evident. While 
only some first timid steps have been taken in building 
what is called the European common Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, it is clear that over time common 
institutions will be required in this field. The sheer force of 
numbers
3 strongly suggests that a European FBI, a 
European Border Guard and a European prosecutor might 
well be operating by the time the next MYFP are discussed 
in the 2010s. 
Moreover, the economies of scale present in the field of 
external security have been forcefully illustrated in recent 
conflicts, from Kosovo to Iraq. When member states do not 
coordinate their policies and pool their means, the Union 
                                                 
3 In an EU-27, a matrix of bilateral liaison officers among 
national policy agencies has over 700 different points of 
contact. A Better Budget for the European Union | 7 
does not count. Progress here has been even slower in this 
area, but many signs indicate that it is speeding up. 
It is ironic that the EU spends the least in these areas when 
survey after survey of public opinion confirms strong 
citizens’ support for greater Union involvement. 
2.5  Provision of European public goods as the 
guiding principle for the EU budget 
This brief discussion suggests one guiding principle for the 
EU budget: expenditure at the EU level is appropriate only 
to safeguard a European public good. Over time, this 
simple principle should become fully reflected in the 
structure of the EU budget. There is no justification to 
spend for decades a major part of the EU’s scarce resources 
on a declining industry such as agriculture. Substantial 
resources will have to continue to be devoted to promoting 
income convergence, which is needed to preserve the 
political cohesion that allows the EU to work efficiently. 
The role of the Union in fostering productivity, growth and 
employment should increase, with strong focus on human 
capital and research. 
And substantial resources will be needed for the Union to 
play its full role in the world and be able to provide strong 
security inside and outside its borders. 
Altogether, this does not seem to require a major increase 
in the Union’s resources. One percent of aggregate 
GDP/GNI seems to provide adequate margins for the Union 
to perform effectively the tasks that have been described. 
This is true, provided that we are able to put money where 
it is needed, rather than continuing to yield to the demands 
of organised interest groups.  
3.  How to finance the EU budget? 
At present the budget of the Union draws its resources from 
custom and agricultural levies (traditional resources), a 
VAT resource levied on a ‘notional’ harmonised VAT 
base,
4 and a ‘fourth’ resource based on gross national 
income (GNI). The latter plays a residual role: its amount is 
determined ex-post so as to fill the gap between actual 
spending and the revenues flowing from the traditional and 
VAT resources. This residual is then allocated amongst the 
member states in proportion to their share in the Union’s 
GNI, and is paid by each member state out of its national 
budget. As may be seen from Table 2, by 2005 this GNI 
resource has come to represent three-quarters of total 
revenues. 
The fact that the GNI resource dominates revenues is in flat 
contradiction with the EC Treaty. Art. 269 prescribes that 
                                                 
4 The base is calculated on the basis of national VAT receipts 
and capped at 50% of each member GNI so as to correct for 
the allegedly regressive nature of VAT. In practice, when 
capping applies, this resource is turned de facto into a GNI-
based resource. Since 2002 the VAT call rate for the Union is 
0.5%. 
“the Union shall be financed wholly from own resources”. 
By contrast, under the present system the vast majority of 
Union resources comes from well-identified contributions 
from national budgets, which the member states inevitably 
consider ‘their money’ and want to compare with ‘their’ 
receipts from the EU budget. 
Table 2. EU-15 own resources, 1996-2005 
Percentage share of revenues:  1996  2000  2005 
Traditional  19.1 17.4 11.4 
VAT  51.3 39.9 14.1 
GNP/GNI  29.6 42.7 74.5 
Total own resources (€ billion)  71.1  88  108.5 
Source: European Commission. 
Indeed, as has been noted, for any individual member 
country, the return from defending an EU-wide, 
encompassing interest is dwarfed by the advantage it can 
obtain from a change in the budget in its own favour, even 
if this leads to lower overall efficiency. 
This perverse incentive structure applies even to the largest 
member country, Germany, which accounts for a little less 
than a quarter of the budget and EU population. For 
Germany the return from spending efficiently one euro on 
some EU-wide interest would be around 25 cents, only a 
quarter of the return of any one euro spent in Germany. 
Thus, if the German government has the choice between 
more spending on a European public good and more 
spending on something that mainly benefits German 
interests, it will always chose the latter.  
The same reasoning applies with even more force to the 
other member countries whose stake in the EU budget is 
smaller. Moreover, the problem grows with each successive 
enlargement because each time the stakes of individual 
member countries in the budget become smaller and 
smaller. For example, the largest new member country, 
Poland, has a share in the EU budget of less than 5% and a 
population share below 10%.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that the new member 
countries concentrate their efforts in diverting EU transfers 
to their own citizens while preserving the present budget 
structure.
5 The skewed distribution of payments to the 
member states under the CAP and the structural fund 
programmes only aggravates the problem. 
                                                 
5 The political importance of the contribution to the EU is 
heightened in countries with a federal fiscal system. For 
example, in Germany the revenues of the federal government 
amount only to around 20% of GDP. This implies that a 
contribution to the EU equivalent to 1% of GDP accounts for 
5% of the revenues of the federal government in Germany. In 
other countries where the revenues of the central government 
are a much higher proportion of GDP, the relative importance 
of the contribution to the EU budget for the central 
governments is smaller, even with similar contributions to the 
EU budget as a share of GDP.  8 | Gros & Micossi 
Figure 3. Payment to EU budget by member state in 2003 
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Figure 4. Operational budgetary balances in 2003 
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Table 3. EU-15 allocated expenditure, payments to EU budget and budgetary balances by member state (annual averages 2000-2003) 
   EU allocated expenditure  Payments to EU budget
d Balances GNI  per  head 
   Total
a Agriculture
b Structural  Operations
c  Total          
   Mio €  % EU TOT  Mio €  % EU AG  Mio €  % EU SO  Mio €  % EU TOT  Mio €  % GNP-GNI
e  Th. € (2003) 
Belgium  1,814.3  2.48 967.4  2.28 225.8  0.89  2,312.4  3.16  -498.0  -0.19  26.5 
Denmark  1,449.5 1.98  1,217.1  2.86  83.4  0.33  1,540.8  2.11  -91.3  -0.05  35.0 
Germany  10,611.5  14.52 6,056.6  14.26 3,651.5  14.35  17,593.4  24.05  -6,981.9  -0.34  25.9 
Greece  5,200.0  7.12 2,652.8  6.24 2,370.1  9.32 1,273.9  1.74  3,926.1  2.95  13.8 
Spain  13,883.6  19.00 6,032.1  14.20 7,531.7  29.60 6,209.2  8.49  7,674.4  1.16  17.4 
France  12,109.8  16.57 9,620.4  22.65 1,813.4  7.13  13,822.4  18.89  -1,712.6  -0.11  26.4 
Ireland  2,526.7 3.46  1,739.1  4.09  704.3  2.77  1,010.1  1.38  1,516.6  1.46  28.1 
Italy  9,497.5  13.00 5,370.2  12.64 3,557.3  13.98  10,605.2  14.50  -1,107.7  -0.09  22.5 
Luxembourg  122.3 0.17  33.7  0.08  7.7  0.03  198.7  0.27  -76.4  -0.38  44.8 
Netherlands  1,836.8  2.51 1,282.1  3.02  244.5  0.96 3,820.5  5.22  -1,983.8  -0.47  28.1 
Austria  1,467.2 2.01  1,072.9  2.53  238.4  0.94  1,853.1  2.53  -385.9  -0.18  27.1 
Portugal  3,697.1 5.06  789.2  1.86  2,776.8  10.91  1,162.3  1.59  2,534.8  2.07  12.6 
Finland  1,220.4  1.67 814.6  1.92 294.2  1.16  1,195.5  1.63  24.9  0.03  27.7 
Sweden  1,229.2  1.68 815.6  1.92 250.4  0.98  2,160.9  2.95  -931.7  -0.38  29.4 
UK  6,416.6  8.78 4,019.4  9.46 1,692.9  6.65 8,395.6  11.48  -1,979.0  -0.04  28.8 
EU-15  73,082.4  100 42,482.9  100 25,442.2  100 73,154.1  100  -71.7      24.7 
a External and administrative expenditures are excluded. 
b Direct aid, export refunds, storage, rural development, other. 
c Structural Funds, other specific structural operations, Cohesion Funds 
d VAT and GNI-based own resources adjusted payments (including UK rebate). It is not the MS actual payments but the allocation key of these payments .This allocation key is applied only to total allocated 
operating expenditure in order for budgetary balances to add up to zero. Total payments are consequently set to equal total EU operating allocated expenditure. 
e Data in % of GNP-GNI are calculated on ESA79 GNP data for 2000-2001 and ESA95 GNI data for 2002-2003. The concept of GNP has been replaced by the GNI in the EU budgetary and own resources area 
from 2002 in accordance with Council Decision No. 2000/597. 
Source: European Commission, September 2004. 
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The problem was aggravated in the 1980s by the decision 
to grant the United Kingdom a ‘rebate’ in order to correct 
an otherwise unbearably large net contribution by that 
country, which has a small agricultural sector and displays 
limited eligibility for structural support (Figure 3). The UK 
rebate and the bitter negotiations that preceded it 
strengthened the perception of the EU budget as a vehicle 
for intergovernmental transfers, reflecting countries’ 
negotiating strength. Over time, the fairness of the rebate 
has come under increasing criticism, since other member 
states with lower per capita income display higher net 
payments to the EU budget, as a ratio to their GNI (i.e. 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden; see Table 
3 and Figure 4). 
On this score, enlargement will only make matters worse, 
since the new member states will attract an increasing share 
of funds at the very time when the willingness to finance 
the EU budget by net contributors is sharply diminished, 
while traditional recipients of structural funds drag their 
feet to delay their inevitable reduction. 
As already indicated, changing this state of affairs requires 
that on the revenue side all links between national 
treasuries and the EU budget be rescinded, and the cost of 
Europe be made to fall directly and visibly on the citizens 
of the Union. 
However, we must also bear in mind that, under Art. 10 of 
the EC Treaty, Community programmes and activities 
within the border of the member states are implemented by 
their public administrations. It is not possible, nor indeed 
desirable, to create a separate EU tax administration. 
Therefore, the solution would be to rely on national tax 
systems and ‘dedicate’ to Europe the revenue from one 
particular tax. Efficiency and equity require that this tax be 
levied on a broad base, harmonised at EU level, at a 
moderate rate. A broad base also entails that special 
allowances on grounds of horizontal equity can be kept to a 
minimum, as the overall burden would continue to amount 
to a small share of GDP/GNI. 
Since the aim is to make the cost of the EU as transparent 
as possible to European citizens, it is tempting to jump to 
the conclusion that the best way to achieve this is to add a 
‘Euro tax’ to the personal income tax return bill that most 
citizens have to fill every year. However, this solution is 
not feasible in practice since it would lead to a highly 
unequal distribution of the burden, given the large 
differences in the national definitions of taxable income. As 
a result, the yield of personal income taxation varies widely 
across member countries, with low values around 3-4% of 
GDP (e.g. Slovakia and Poland) and peaks over 25% of 
GDP (e.g. Denmark). 
Narrowness and lack of harmonisation of the base also 
seem to rule out, as feasible alternative, a surcharge on 
corporate income. The proposal of taking the money for the 
EU from central bank reserves does not meet the test of 
visibility and accountability vis-à-vis European citizens.  
Most of these difficulties do not arise with the VAT. Its 
base has been reasonably harmonised; the rates do not 
differ as greatly as do those for personal income taxation; 
the differences in yields are relatively minor, ranging from 
a low around 6% of GDP in countries like Italy and Spain 
to a maximum of 9% of GDP in Hungary and Sweden (see 
Table 4). 
Table 4. Private consumption and VAT (% of GDP, 2003) 
  Private consumption 
/GDP  VAT/GDP 
EU-25   58.3  7.0 
EU-15  58.2  7.0 
Belgium  54.5  7.0 
Czech Republic  50.9  6.5 
Denmark  47.2  9.7 
Germany  59.0  6.5 
Estonia  56.6  8.9 
Greece  67.2  7.8 
Spain  57.8  6.3 
France  55.5  7.2 
Ireland  45.2  7.2 
Italy  60.4  6.1 
Latvia  63.0  7.3 
Lithuania  64.9  6.9 
Luxembourg  41.9  6.5 
Hungary  54.7  9.1 
Malta  60.8  7.1 
The Netherlands  48.4  7.7 
Austria  56.1  7.9 
Poland  66.0  8.2 
Portugal  62.3  8.5 
Slovenia  54.4  8.9 
Slovakia  55.3  6.8 
Finland  52.3  8.6 
Sweden  48.7  9.2 
UK  65.5  7.1 
Source: Eurostat, 2005. 
A flat rate of around 2% throughout the Union should be 
sufficient to finance a EU budget of about the present size 
(1% of GDP). The receipts for all purchases subject to VAT 
would show the amount paid to the European Union, thus 
making citizens aware of their contribution. The VAT 
receipts pertaining to the Union would be transferred 
automatically and continuously to Union accounts, as they 
accrue to VAT offices in the member states, and would no 
longer be shown on national budgets. The burden on 
national budgets would change only marginally, since 
lower receipts on account of VAT would be largely offset 
by lower payments to the EU budget under the GNI 
resource. 
Under this proposal, ideally the EU budget would be 
covered by only one tax, with clear benefits of transparency 
and visibility. However, Art. 268 requires the budget of the 
Union always to be ‘in balance’. Therefore, some 
mechanisms for ex-post adjustment of revenues in light of 12 | Gros & Micossi 
actual spending, such as the existing GNI resource, has to 
be maintained. This mechanism, however, should amount 
to no more than a small shock absorber to make up for 
unforeseen differences between actual revenues and 
expenditures, with net excesses and shortfalls of spending 
shared on the basis of shares in overall GNI. 
An EU VAT surcharge would lead to a reasonably even 
distribution of the burden, and would not necessarily be 
regressive. Traditionally, the view has been held that poorer 
countries have higher consumption as a proportion of 
income, and hence a relatively larger VAT base. However, 
the data in Table 4 indicate that among the countries with 
high VAT revenues one finds both rich (Sweden) and poor 
(Hungary); the same applies to countries with low VAT 
revenues in proportion to GDP (e.g. Spain, a cohesion 
country, and Italy, with GDP per capita above the EU 
average). 
Introducing a European VAT surcharge would not 
immediately eliminate the view taken by governments that 
the most important aspect of the EU budget is the national 
‘net balance’, because governments would probably 
consider that the contributions made by their citizens 
towards the EU budget should just be seen against the 
benefits their citizens and enterprises receive. But the 
amounts contributed to the Union would no longer appear 
on national budgets, and the EU citizens would have a 
direct feel of how much they have to pay for common 
policies.
6 
An issue that needs to be decided is whether a correction 
mechanism for net imbalances that appeared 
disproportionately large should be maintained. On this, the 
Commission has proposed to discontinue the present ‘UK 
only’ rebate and to replace it with a generalised correction 
mechanism whereby any emerging large imbalance would 
be trimmed down and the burden would be spread out 
among the other EU member states. 
It is interesting to note in this regard that, within the EU-15, 
net imbalances have tended to shrink over time, reflecting 
reduced structural support, due to the convergence of 
income per capita, and lower payments under the CAP 
(Table 5). Figure 5 shows that between 1993 and 2003, the 
relationship between net imbalances and differences 
                                                 
6 As an aside, one might note that in general it does not matter 
whether one uses GDP or GNP as the base for the ability of a 
country to contribute to the EU (and be eligible for Structural 
Funds) since for most countries the difference between GDP 
and GNP is minor, less than 1%. The one important exception 
is Ireland, where GDP is about 20% higher than GNP. This is 
attributable to the fact that a large proportion of the value 
added produced in Ireland (measured by GDP) originates in 
enterprises owned by foreign firms. This is a consequence of 
the large amount of FDI Ireland has received over the last 
decades. Some of the new member countries might soon 
experience a similar phenomenon since they are also receiving 
a sustained large inflow of FDI. 
in per capita income within the EU-15 has grown less steep. 
This appears to be mainly a consequence of the 
reduction in agricultural payments.  
Table 5. EU-15 net balances 1993-2003 (averages over 
stated periods as a percentage of GDP/GNI) 
Country 1993-96  1996-99  2000-03 
Belgium 0.03  -0.17  -0.19 
Denmark   0.31  0.05  -0.05 
Germany -0.65  -0.55  -0.34 
Greece 4.50  3.92  2.95 
Spain 1.13  1.28  1.16 
France -0.14  -0.11  -0.11 
Ireland 5.40  4.06  1.46 
Italy -0.18  -0.15  -0.09 
Luxembourg -0.54  -0.47  -0.38 
The Netherlands  -0.25  -0.49  -0.47 
Austria -0.35  -0.36  -0.16 
Portugal 3.17  3.09  2.07 
Finland   -0.06  -0.09  0.03 
Sweden -0.41  -0.48  -0.38 
UK -0.13  -0.19  -0.04 
Standard deviation  1.94  1.66  1.04 
Source: European Commission. 
Thus, the straight answer is that – once the CAP is phased 
out – a correction mechanism for net imbalances is no 
longer needed. The reason is two-fold. First, with the CAP 
out of the way, spending under the EU budget could 
legitimately be considered as a genuine expression of 
public preference for European public goods. Second, with 
a European VAT surcharge financing the whole budget, the 
cost of European public goods would be borne by all 
countries and their citizens, roughly in proportion to their 
consumption spending and incomes. (see Figure 3, lower 
quadrant). 
The elimination of the UK rebate, without any other 
mechanism taking its place, would be another important 
contribution to breaking the link between national 
treasuries and the EU budget.  A Better Budget for the European Union | 13 
Figure 5. Net balances and GNP/GNI per head in 1993 and 2003 (thousands of ecu and euro) 
Scatter plot and linear regression 
NLD ITA
ESP
PRT
GRC
IRL
FR
BEL
GER
DNK
LUX
GBR
GRC
PRT
ESP IRL
LUX DNK
ITA GBR
FRA SWE
GER
NLD
FIN BEL
AUT
1993
2003
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
GNP/GNI per head
N
e
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
1993 2003
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2003 and 2004. 
 14 | Gros & Micossi 
4.  Overhauling decision-making 
Decision-making procedures play a central role in 
preserving the anachronistic structure of the budget that has 
been described, and should therefore be changed. See 
Annex 2 for an historical chronology of budgetary 
decision-making. 
The EC Treaty has explicit provisions for deciding the 
system of own resources and the yearly budget, but not the 
MYFP, which is where all the key budgetary decisions are 
taken. 
The system of own resources is decided by the Council by 
unanimous vote, based on a proposal by the Commission 
and after consulting the Parliament. The decision thus taken 
is then recommended for adoption by the member states “in 
accordance to their constitutional requirements” (Art. 269).  
Decisions on the yearly budget are taken by Council (by 
qualified majority) and Parliament (by absolute majority) 
together (Art. 272); Council has last say over ‘compulsory’ 
expenditures,
7 which notably includes the CAP, and 
Parliament has last say over the rest of the budget. The 
budget has to cover all expenses of EU institutions 
(universality) and must always be in balance. The 
Commission prepares the preliminary draft budget, but 
subsequently has no formal role in the decision. 
Nevertheless, it is responsible for executing the budget. 
The system of the MYFP was agreed at the end of the 
1980s, after years of bitter contests between Council and 
Parliament that had led to paralysis and in two instances to 
rejection of the budget by Parliament (in 1979 and 1984). 
Under this new system, the Council fixes by unanimity the 
MYFP for a period between five and seven years, which 
include annual ceilings for total resources and the main 
headings of spending. The initial proposal is prepared by 
the Commission, but the Council may modify it as it 
wishes. The European Parliament negotiates with the 
Council and then votes a resolution, by simple majority, 
accepting the Council decision. In practice, it has had little 
influence on the main figures – for the CAP and structural 
spending – but has used the opportunity to extract 
concessions concerning its own interests, e.g. the influence 
of the EP in other areas.  
The MYFP are then enshrined in an inter-institutional 
agreement that binds Council, Commission and Parliament 
to ‘loyal cooperation’ in yearly budgetary decisions, and 
notably to respect yearly expenditure ceilings. 
It should be noted that these arrangements are not codified 
in any legal document setting out budgetary procedures, but 
                                                 
7 Compulsory expenditures are only obliquely referred to in 
Art. 272, para. 9, of the EC Treaty: “A maximum rate of 
increase … shall be fixed annually for the total expenditure 
other than that necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from 
acts adopted in accordance therewith”. The precise 
classification of expenditures falling within this category can 
be found in annexes to the inter-institutional agreements. 
are renewed by consensus by the three institutions at the 
expiration of each MYFP. 
There are three main drawbacks in this system. First, the 
yearly budget – which is the instrument with legal value 
under the Treaty – is not the real seat of budgetary 
decisions, which are taken elsewhere. Second, all 
significant decisions are in practice taken by the Council, 
outside the Community method and based on 
intergovernmental negotiations where every member state 
pursues mainly national interest and has veto power. Third, 
the MYFP are adopted for time periods that are completely 
disconnected with the time interval of legislatures and 
Commission tenure. 
The Constitutional Treaty will improve this situation 
considerably, but more could be done. Under the 
Constitutional Treaty, the MYFP will take the form of a 
European law of the Council, still decided by unanimity, 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The 
Commission has no formal role of proposal. Furthermore, 
the category of compulsory expenditures has been 
suppressed, thus broadening the Parliament’s vetting to 
include the entire yearly budget. See Annex 3. 
Clearly, the Union will not have a proper budget, as an 
expression of its priorities and policy goals, until both the 
MYFP and the yearly budget are decided by Community 
method, that is by co-decision of Council – deciding by 
majority vote – and Parliament, based on a legally binding 
Commission proposal. However, this decision-making 
power should not extend unchecked to the decision on the 
total resources ceiling, since the latter impinges on national 
parliaments’ taxation powers. Moreover, the European 
Parliament is likely to have a bias in favour of more 
spending at the European level. 
As we have argued, there are a number of areas where the 
greater European interest might best be served not by more 
spending at the EU level, but by other measures, for 
example increasing competition or coordination of national 
policies. A counterweight is thus needed.  
One way to do this would be to leave the last word on total 
resources to the Council, but let the European Parliament 
determine their allocation across categories of spending. 
Such a distribution of competences is likely to lead to a 
useful implicit negotiation in which the allocation of 
spending proposed by the European Parliament would be 
accepted by the Council to the extent that it reflected 
European interests and ‘value for money’. Were this not the 
case, the Council would reject the demands for a higher 
resource ceiling, and cut it to size. 
Another beneficial change, which does not require a change 
in the Treaty, would be to synchronise the reference period 
for the MYFP with the terms of office of the Parliament, so 
as to strengthen the interrelation between budgetary 
decisions and the results of the European elections. The 
MYFP should run for five years, and enter into force one 
year after the election of a new Parliament, to allow it 
sufficient time to deliberate after election.  A Better Budget for the European Union | 15 
With this change, the content of the MYFP would become a 
main theme in the campaigns for the election of the 
European Parliament, with a likely increase in voters’ 
interest in the elections and their turn out.  
A new change in the Treaty will not be feasible until 2009. 
However, already now, the Parliament could send out the 
right political signals, once it starts its own work on the 
new MYFP. It should tell the Council that it will accept 
whatever ceiling member states put on overall spending, 
but at the same time that it will expect to have a main say 
over the composition of spending, and it should indicate 
what expenditures it considers a priority. 
In this game of self-restraint, the Parliament, by accepting 
the ceiling on total expenditures, will gain credibility with 
governments and the electorate. In exchange, it will have 
affirmed its role in deciding what European public goods 
should come from the Union budget. 
5.  A budget that fosters European interests 
The considerations that have been developed so far point to 
the need for a radically different European budget, one that 
would really foster European interests. 
An example of such a changed budget was prepared by the 
Sapir Report. Rather than providing precise euro amounts,  
they expressed each heading as a percentage of the total 
yearly budget over the MYFP period. 
In Table 6 we have followed the same approach to present 
our figures. In order to make clear where we differ, we 
have included the budgets outlined by the Sapir Report and 
the proposal tabled by the Commission for the new MYFP 
2007-13. At the bottom of the table, for reference, we 
provide a notional amount in euro of the total budget, based 
on the GDP estimates for 2007-13 used by the Commission 
for its proposal. 
The Sapir Report assumed that the EU budget would be 
limited to 1% of aggregate GDP. As may be seen, they 
already propose to abandon the CAP and to concentrate 
resources on two main headings devoted to “growth and 
competitiveness” (45% of the total) and “convergence” 
(40% of the total). No allowance is made for the new public 
goods of internal and external security. The lion’s share of 
“growth” funds (25%) is assigned to R&D and sizeable 
resources are reserved for infrastructures and a much 
strengthened common action for education. The latter 
appears somewhat excessive, in view of the need to meet 
the tests of Community value added and subsidiarity. As to 
“convergence” funds, the main indication is that two-thirds 
should be reserved for new entrants and one-third for old 
members in the EU. Some “restructuring” funds are 
earmarked to assist the mobility of displaced workers and 
phase out agricultural expenditure.  
 
 
 
Table 6. Options for the EU budget* (percentages of total budget) 
Appropriations for payments  Sapir Report  Commission**  Our budget 
Growth & competitiveness  45.0  13.0  37.5 
R&D (25.0)  (4.0)  (25.0) 
Infrastructure (12.5)  (8.0)  (10.0) 
Education (7.5)  (1.0)  (2.5) 
Structural adjustment  -  10.0  - 
Agriculture 15.0  30.0  - 
Convergence 40.0  35.0  40.0 
Environment -  -  (10.0) 
Foreign policy and external actions  -  10.0  7.5 
Freedom security and justice  -  2.0  7.5 
Defence -  -  7.5 
Total 100  100  100 
Own resources ceiling  (% of GNP)  1.00  1.24  1.00 
VAT resource  - 0.25***  0.95 
GNI (residual) resource  - 0.75  0.05 
Notional yearly amount (€ billion)  115  145  115 
* The figures in the first two columns are adjusted to make them comparable with our proposal and, due to lack of 
precise information on underlying estimates for budgetary sub-headings, can only be considered rough 
approximations of actual numbers. The Commission data are based on its proposals for the MYFP 2007-13. 
** The Commission figures have been obtained as averages of yearly figures for appropriation commitments for the 
period 2007-13. Minor adjustments have been made in order to facilitate comparison: for example administrative 
expenditures have been allocated proportionately among the various budgetary headings and are not reported. 
*** This figure also includes other traditional resources from customs and agricultural levies. 16 | Gros & Micossi 
The Commission proposal for the new MYFP interprets the 
agreement on CAP as a floor, rather than as a ceiling, and 
thus maintains the support to agriculture under the CAP at 
current levels until 2013, but posits a large increase in total 
resources, to 1.24% of GNI. Thus, the share of direct 
agricultural support in total spending falls to around 30%, 
and larger resources are devoted to convergence (35%), 
growth and competitiveness (13%) and external actions 
(not present in the Sapir Report exercise). A small 
allowance is also made for action under the heading of 
freedom, security and justice. A substantial amount – some 
10% of the budget – is reserved for external action, mainly 
development assistance to poorer countries; unfortunately, 
much of this money is of little use to foster development, as 
long as the agricultural exports of poor countries are denied 
access to European markets owing to the CAP.  
The main difficulty with the Commission proposal, of 
course, is that the member states do not seem willing to 
raise the resource ceiling to 1.24%; indeed a number of 
countries have proposed that the ceiling be lowered to 1%. 
But in this case, the invariance of agricultural spending 
would leave insufficient room to accommodate the 
competing demands for structural funds by old and new 
member states and the badly needed expenditure for growth 
and cohesion. Once again, ‘bad money’ for agriculture 
would eliminate from the budget ‘good money’ for 
productivity, growth and employment. 
Neither the Sapir Report nor the Commission makes any 
substantial allowance for the potential requirements of 
internal and external security and defence. 
The last column of Table 6 presents our budget ‘that makes 
sense’; this should be seen as an indication of how the 
budget should look like after 2013, rather than as an 
alternative proposal for the new MYFP.  
As may be seen, all spending for agriculture has been 
eliminated form the budget, and this creates sufficient room 
to pursue the new tasks to be entrusted to the Union. The 
main features of our proposed budget are the following: 
i)  The large increase of spending for research envisaged 
in the Sapir Report is maintained; the allowance for   
 
education is reduced to 2.5%, on ground that this is an 
area where the Union can play an enhanced 
‘complementary’ role, notably by promoting strong 
educational standards and much raising student and 
teachers mobility, but not intervene directly e.g. by 
establishing educational institutions. 
ii)  Spending for ‘convergence’ is raised to 40% of the 
budget – which leaves room for some continuing 
support within the old member states – with 10% 
earmarked for environmental rehabilitation in the new 
member states; however, no allowance is made for 
‘restructuring’, under the assumption that in the main 
this task should be left with the member states. 
iii)  Funds available for external action are reduced 
somewhat, under the assumption that full access of 
developing countries’ products to EU markets will 
more than compensate them for the loss of direct 
financial assistance. 
iv)  Substantial amounts are allocated to internal and 
external security and defence, altogether 15.0% of the 
total budget. 
This last change is possibly the most important one. The 
Union needs substantial resources for internal security, the 
protection of external borders against international crime 
and illegal immigration, and military units for 
peacekeeping and the rapid reaction force.  
Common infrastructures will be needed to perform new 
domestic tasks in the areas of justice, police and 
immigration. Of course, not all of these new functions will 
be managed by the Commission and in each case 
appropriate special arrangements will be required. 
What is important is to recognise the need for a step jump 
in activity by the Union in these fields, and to signal 
determination to act by making resources available and 
creating appropriate operational structures. This 
acceleration of integration and common action will no 
doubt be fully supported by public opinion, which has been 
consistently requesting it for a number of years.  
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Annex 1. Section on R&D and Lisbon 
About five years have elapsed since the Lisbon ‘strategy’ (or dream?) was officially adopted. The facts are 
not encouraging. Since 2000, the relative and absolute decline of the performance of the European 
economy that started in 1995 (but was partially obscured by the ‘dotcom’ boom of the late 1990s) has 
continued. In the EU, labour productivity has declined every year and has now reached unprecedented 
levels. Part of this decline can be explained, but even total factor productivity (the unexplained part) is now 
close to an historical low. 
There is general agreement that, among other factors, a lack of innovation is responsible for this 
unsatisfactory performance. Some might argue that it is difficult to explain the deterioration of the EU’s 
performance relative to its own past by a lack of innovation since no absolute indicator of R&D or other 
innovation activity has declined. But the key fact remains that the gap with the US has increased. 
In judging the recent performance of the EU, one has to keep in mind that a low intensity of research 
gradually translates into a low level of accumulated knowledge tomorrow. This effect seems to have 
worked to increase the distance between the EU and the US over the last decade. Accordingly, using a 
precise metric for the knowledge capital per worker, Bottazzi (2003) finds that this indicator has more than 
trebled in the US and Japan from 1972 to 1995, while it rose much less in the EU countries. The proxy for 
innovative or knowledge capital is the cumulated number of patents (with each patent weighed with the 
average yearly number of citations a patent posted with the US patent office receives in its first three years 
of existence). As this trend must have continued over the last decade, the distance between the EU and the 
US can only have increased.  
The Lisbon targets for R&D were confirmed at the Barcelona European Council in March 2002. 
Furthermore, the latter Council meeting agreed that investment in European R&D must be increased to 3% 
of GDP by 2010, with at least two-thirds of the total investment coming from the private sector. This target 
implies a total public sector expenditure of around €100 billion in absolute terms.  
At present, R&D amount to 2% of EU GDP, or €200 billion. Increasing this to 3% of GDP would imply an 
increase of about €100 billion. It is clear that only a small share of this increase could and should come 
from the EU budget. Even under most optimistic assumption, as embodied in the Commission’s proposed 
financial framework, the funding for the ‘European Research Area’ would increase by around €8 billion 
(from €5 billion p.a. today to around €13 billion in 2013), constituting around 8% of the total increase 
required. (FN: And this assumes zero crowding out of national expenditure.) 
While the ‘quantity’ gap, i.e. the difference in overall spending on R&D between the EU and the US is well 
known, another, less well known, gap might be more important. This might be called the ‘quality gap’ and 
concerns the rate at which R&D spending generates commercially-exploitable ideas. The latter can be 
measured by patent application. This metric shows that US knowledge workers are almost twice as 
productive as their EU counterparts, as shown in Table A1. 
Table A1. Comparisons in research intensity and productivity 
Research productivity 
(patents per thousand employees) 
Country  Research 
intensity 
(% of workers
in R&D) 
EPO USPTO  Average EPO 
and USPTO  
UK 0.32  0.19  0.14  0.16 
EU 0.28  0.29  0.17  0.23 
US 0.69  0.19  0.63  0.41 
Japan 0.65  0.26  0.47  0.37 
 
The relative inefficiency of European R&D must be linked to the segmentation of public research efforts, 
overlapping of competing research programmes, and thus, underutilisation of available human resources. 
The 6
th Framework Programme constitutes a useful tool to streamline research and promote cross-frontier 
collaboration and a certain degree of integration of research projects. Nevertheless, the total resources of A Better Budget for the European Union | 19 
the 6
th Framework Programme amount to only some 5% of the total public spending on research in the EU 
and thus can only exert marginal influence on the structure and direction of research. 
The quality problem (the low rate of commercially exploitable ideas per worker) cannot be solved by 
governments alone, and certainly not by the EU alone. But it also certain that more competition in the R&D 
sector should help to increase its productivity. At present almost all national R&D funding (which 
constitutes 95% of EU total) is reserved for national applicants (i.e. national universities, research centres, 
etc.). Opening this sector to EU-wide competition should help to increase concentration and avoid 
duplication. A world-class European Institute of Technology is more likely to emerge through competition 
for the best ideas than by EU fiat. The experience with R&D institutions that are financed directly by the 
budget is also mixed.  
A simple calculation can illustrate the cost-effectiveness of market opening versus a larger EU budget for 
R&D. Opening national (public sector) R&D funding to EU-wide competition could probably increase 
productivity by 20% or more in this sector, as many studies have shown that in a number of member 
countries R&D spending is effectively captured by a small group of well-connected insiders. Such a gain 
on 1% of GDP would be equivalent to an increase in effective R&D equivalent to 0.2% of GDP (or €20 
billion), much more than what the EU is spending in this area. 
The time has therefore now come to create an integrated EU market for research and for researchers, as 
already proposed by the Commission a decade ago. 
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Annex 2. Chronology of budgetary decision-making 
Year Document  EU  Financial  provisions  Comment 
1958  EEC TREATY  Contributions from MS  Annuality of the budget 
1965  MERGER TREATY  Merger of ECSC and EURATOM 
administrative budgets into EEC budget 
 
1970  LUXEMBOURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
(Dec. 70/243/CECA,CEE,EURATOM;  
OJ n.L94, 28/04/1970) 
Introduction of system of own resources 
(OR): 
- custom duties & agricultural levies 
- resource based on a harmonised VAT 
based; call rate at 1%. 
Difficulties with establishing a common VAT system across MS and with the 
base for VAT assessment, delayed the introduction of VAT as OR until 1979. 
Enhancement of Community's financial independence from MS' transfers. 
1970  LUXEMBOURG TREATY 
(Treaty amending certain budgetary 
provisions) 
- Introduction of a distinction between 
compulsory and non-compulsory 
expenditure; 
- European Parliament given power to adopt 
the budget. 
EP decision excluded for compulsory expenditures 
Budget discharge to be given by joint Council/ Parliament decision. 
1975  BRUSSELS TREATY 
(Treaty amending certain financial 
provisions) 
- Co-decision for adoption of the budget , 
new allocation of responsibility between 
Council and Parliament 
- Budget control entrusted to Court of 
Auditors 
Decision-making powers on budgetary matters shared between the Council and 
Parliament. The Parliament now gains last word on non-compulsory 
expenditure; it can reject the budget and acts alone in granting discharge. 
        1975-1987 Resource inadequacy and persistent complaints by the UK about its 
financial contribution. Disputes between budgetary authorities. 
1984   FONTAINEBLEAU EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL 
(Own resources Decision No 85/257) 
Temporary solution for budgetary 
imbalances. 
Call rate for the VAT resource rose to 1.4%. 
Correction mechanism for budgetary imbalances of the UK. 
1988  BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL.  
(Dec.88/376/EEC, on the system of the 
Communities' Own resources) 
Reform of the Community's financial system
(DELORS I) 
New resource based on member states’ GNP; overall ceiling on OR; capping of 
VAT resource base at 55% of GNP to reduce regressivity. 
1988  BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL.  
(Dec.88/377 EEC, on budgetary discipline, 
IIA on budgetary discipline and 
improvement of the budgetary procedure, 
on 29 June 1988) 
Reform of the Community's financial system
(DELORS I) 
Introduction of new budgetary discipline arrangements, binding on all the 
institutions. 
The system of MYFP is introduced for 1988-1992 as integral part of 
Interinstitutional Agreement between Council, Parliament and Commission. 
1992  MAASTRICHT TREATY  Establishment of Cohesion Fund  Modest budgetary implications A Better Budget for the European Union | 21 
1992  EDINBURGH AGREEMENT 
(Dec.94/728/EEC, on the system of the 
Communities' Own resource; Dec.94/729 
EEC, on budgetary discipline, IIA on 
budgetary discipline and improvement of 
the budgetary procedure, on 29 October 
1993) 
The DELORS II Package  Increase of the overall ceiling on OR  from 1,20% to 1,27%; further decrease of 
the importance of VAT in the financing of the budget by capping VAT resource 
at 50% of GNP; 
Adoption of new MYFP for 1993-1999.  
1992-
1999 
      1992-1999 Significant difficulties during the recession years of early 90s. The 
OR system into force only in 1995, successive downwards revisions in economic 
growth during 1992-1994 resulted in downwards revisions to budgetary 
revenues. Nevertheless, the OR ceiling constraint was respected. 
1999  BERLIN EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
(Dec.00/597 /EEC, on the system of the 
Communities' Own resources; 
Reg.2040/2000 EC, on budgetary discipline, 
IIA on budgetary discipline and 
improvement of the budgetary procedure, 
on 6 May 1999) 
AGENDA 2000  Gradual decrease of the maximum rate of call for the VAT resource from 1% to 
0.75% in 2002 and 0.50% in 2004. The overall ceiling for own resources kept at 
1.27%.  
Adoption of new MYFP for 2000-2006. 
Ceiling on agriculture (see Excerpt 1 below from document below) until 2006. 
2002  Brussels European Council October 2002 
(Doc. 14702/02 5) 
Enlargement, position by EU-15  Ceiling on agricultural spending for next financial perspective (2007-2013). See 
Excerpt 2 below. 
2002  Copenhagen European Council December 
2002 (Doc. 15917/02 12) 
Enlargement agreement with new member 
countries. 
Ceiling on agricultural spending for next financial perspective (2007-2013) 
confirmed with sliding time path. See Excerpt 3 below. 
2004  COMMISSION PROPOSAL 
(COM(2004)501 on the system of the 
Communities' Own resources, 
COM(2004)487 Financial Perspectives 
2007-2013, COM(2004)498 on IIA on 
budgetary discipline and improvement of 
the budgetary procedure) 
The new FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES 
2007-2013 
Own resources ceiling at 1.24% for 2007-2013. 
Proposal for a generalised mechanism for the correction of budgetary 
imbalances. 
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Excerpt 1. Berlin European Council 1999 (current Financial Perspective) 
D.  Heading 1 (Agriculture) 
Agricultural guideline 
Overall level of allocations for heading 1 
23. In the light of these decisions, the European Council considers that the amounts to be entered in 
heading 1 of the financial perspective should not exceed:  
 
Heading 1 (Agriculture) (Mio. euros 1999 prices) 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
40920  42800  43900  43770  42760  41930  41660 
CAP expenditure (excluding rural development and accompanying measures)  
36620 38480  39570 39430 38410 37570  37290 
Rural development and accompanying measures 
4300 4320  4330 4340 4350 4360  4370 
The Interinstitutional Agreement should include a provision ensuring that all parties to it will respect 
the financial perspective ceiling for agriculture. 
*** 
 
Excerpt 2. Brussels European Council October 2002 (Doc. 14702/02 5) 
 
Budgetary and financial issues (2004-2006) 
 
10.  The ceiling for enlargement-related expenditure set out for the years 2004-2006 by the European 
Council in Berlin must be respected. 
 
11.  The Union’s expenditure must continue to respect both the imperative of budgetary discipline and 
efficient expenditure, and the need to ensure that the enlarged Union has sufficient resources at its 
disposal to ensure the orderly development of its policies for the benefit of all its citizens. 
 
The phasing-in will take place within a framework of financial stability, where total annual 
expenditure for market-related expenditure and direct payments in a Union of 25 cannot, in the period 
2007-2013, exceed the amount in real terms of the ceiling of category 1.A for the year 2006 agreed in 
Berlin for the EU-15 and the proposed corresponding expenditure ceiling for the new Member States 
for the year 2006. The overall expenditure in nominal terms for market-related expenditure and direct 
payments for each year in the period 2007-2013 shall be kept below this 2006 figure increased by 1% 
per year. 
 
*** 
 A Better Budget for the European Union | 23 
Excerpt 3. Copenhagen European Council December 2002 (Doc. 15917/02 12) 
 
ANNEX I 
BUDGETARY AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 
 
Based on the accession of 10 new Member States by 1 May 2004, the maximum appropriations for 
commitments for agriculture, structural operations, internal policies and administration for the new 
Member States should be the amounts now determined as a result of the negotiations at this European 
Council, as set out in the following table: 
 
This is without prejudice to the EU 25 ceiling for category 1a for 2007-13 set out in the Decision of 
the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council on 14 
November 2002, concerning the conclusions of the European Council meeting in Brussels on 24 and 
25 October 2002.  
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Annex 3. Budgetary provisions in the Constitutional Treaty 
1. The yearly budget becomes “European law”: 
art. I-34, I-56:  A European law shall establish the Union's annual budget … The “budget law” shall be 
adopted, on the basis of proposals from the Commission, by the European Parliament and 
the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure. 
2. The MYFP are brought into the Treaty: 
art I-55:  The multi-annual financial framework shall ensure that Union expenditure develops in an 
orderly manner and within the limits of its own resources. MYFP will take the form of an 
European law of the Council (decided unanimously after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, given by a majority of its component members.) 
art. III-402:  The multi-annual financial framework shall be established for a period of at least five 
years. The financial framework will determine the amounts of the annual ceilings on commitment 
appropriations by category of expenditure and of the annual ceiling on payment appropriations.  
The financial framework shall lay down any other provisions required for the annual 
budgetary procedure to run smoothly. 
3. Application of Community method to budgetary decisions 
art III-404   for the yearly budget; also suppression of the category of compulsory expenditures 
art. III-396  for the MYFP 
4. New procedure for decision on the annual budget 
The Commission presents the draft budget to the European Parliament and to the Council. 
The Council adopts its position on the draft budget and forwards it to the European Parliament. 
If the European Parliament: 
(a) approves the position of the Council or does not take a decision, the European law establishing the 
budget shall be adopted; 
(b) adopts amendments by a majority of its component members, the amended draft budget is forwarded to 
the Council and to the Commission. The President of the European Parliament, in agreement with the 
President of the Council, shall convene a meeting of the Conciliation Committee. 
The Conciliation Committee seeks an agreement on a joint text, by a qualified majority of the members of 
the Council and by a majority of the representatives of the European Parliament. 
If the Conciliation Committee agrees on a joint text the European Parliament and the Council shall each 
have a period of 14 days to approve the joint text.  
If: 
(a) the European Parliament and the Council both approve the joint text or fail to take a decision, the 
European law establishing the budget is deemed to be definitively adopted in accordance with the joint text. 
(b) the European Parliament, acting by a majority of its component members, and the Council both reject 
the joint text, or if one of them rejects the joint text while the other one fails to take a decision, a new draft 
budget shall be submitted by the Commission. 
(c) the European Parliament approves the joint text whilst the Council rejects it, the European Parliament 
may, acting by a majority of its component members and three-fifths of the votes cast, decide to confirm all 
or some of the amendments. 
Where a European Parliament amendment is not confirmed, the position agreed in the Conciliation 
committee on the budget heading which is the subject of the amendment shall be retained.  A Better Budget for the European Union | 25 
The European law establishing the budget shall be deemed to be definitively adopted.  
If the Conciliation Committee does not agree on a joint text, a new draft budget shall be submitted by the 
Commission. 
Once the procedure has been completed, the President of the European Parliament shall declare that the 
European law establishing the budget has been definitively adopted. 
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About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
    Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 